ABSTRACT. This study examines the impact of culture on regulation and corruption. Our empirical results suggest that cultural values have significant effects on countries' regulatory policies, levels of corruption, and economic development. Contrary to the conclusions drawn by others, this study shows no significant relationship between the regulatory policies of countries and their perceived levels of corruption. Thus, evidence of the ''public choice view'' toward entry regulation derived in related studies seems to be at least attenuated.
In recent decades, the social sciences have witnessed a dissociation between the studies of values, symbols, and studies of social relations, modes of organizing, and institutions. Cultural studies processed as if mental products were manufactured in an institutional vacuum, while studies of social relations ignore how people justify to themselves and to others the way in which they live. One of the most important contributions of our sociocultural theory, we believe, is bringing these two aspects of human life together (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 21). Regulation is one important component of market mechanisms, reflecting the existence of social order by both the presence of regulatory rules and attempts to enforce them (Hancher and Moran, 1989) . The presence of these rules is represented in the form of governmental legislation and law, and the attempt to enforce these rules depends on the authority structures in societies. Two questions, ''Who benefits most from regulation?'' and ''Who makes regulatory decisions?'' are plainly central to understanding the difference between various views of regulation theory.
As to the first question, the ''Public Interest Theory'' and the ''Public Choice Theory'' provide quite distinctive answers. Since Adam Smith, the logic of regulation theory flowed from the goal of governmental intervention to lessen or eliminate the inefficiencies provoked by market failure (Pigou, 1960, pp. 336-380) . This early approach is called ''Public Interest Theory,'' and it is open to continued dispute. However, most were reluctant to challenge and test it until the 1960s. Stigler and Friedland (1962) introduced ''Public Choice Theory'' in their pioneering study of the effects of regulation on electricity rates. Contrary to previous expectations, they found that electricity rates were not lower after regulation, 1 and they argued against the apparent benefits of regulation. Then, in his classic article in 1971, Stigler argues that regulation is actually promoted by industry, and is designed and operated primarily for industry's own benefits; and such an approach he called the ''Capture Theory.'' As another branch of ''Public Choice Theory,'' the ''Tollbooth Approach'' holds that regulation is pursued for the benefits of politicians and bureaucrats rather than the welfare of society as a whole. Such regulation activities concentrate on rent creation, that is, the use of governmental power to create rents via entry controls, regulatory cartel enforcement, or raising rivals' costs (Banfield, 1975; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) . Another prominent feature of the ''Tollbooth Approach'' is called rent extraction, which means the intent to threaten private rents through price controls, threats to withdraw special licenses and charters, destruction of name-brand capital, and imposition of excise taxes (McChesney, 1997) .
A related second question concerns the allocation of authority in societies. The objectives of forcing organizations to behave according to a common set of behavioral norms can be attained through two different regulatory regimes, either government legislation or industry self-regulation. Government legislation concentrates on institutional solutions ultimately defining unacceptable behaviors as illegal ones. However, one disadvantage of this regime comes from its high-social costs such as financial expense, red tape, stultification of innovation, corruption, and implementation delays.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the apparent failures of regulation, particularly in command economies, evoked a growing trend toward ''deregulation'' or ''self-regulation'' (Reich, 1984) . Many economists have tried to provide evidence of the efficacy and benefits of self-regulation (Shaked and Sutton, 1981) based on its reduction of rent seeking. They argued that self-regulation could help societies develop obligation and responsibility. However, others have pointed out the dysfunctional aspects of its complete dependence on social values and behavioral mechanisms (Brien, 1998) .
A huge contribution was made to the study of regulation and its antecedents and consequences by the publication of Djankov et al. (2002) data on entry regulations around the world. They collected regulation data from 85 countries covering the number of procedures, time for entry permits, and official cost that start-up firms must bear before being allowed to operate legally. Using an OLS regression approach to analyzing their data, Djankov et al. (2002) showed that ''...stricter regulation of entry is associated with sharply higher levels of corruption, and a greater relative size of the unofficial economy.'' (p. 4). In associated comments and in their use of a regression model they imply a causal relationship between economic factors, regulatory factors, and their defined dependent variable, corruption, while explaining some 80% of the variance in the last: ''The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports public choice views that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats '' (Djankov et al., 2002, p 
. 1).
The proof provided by Djankov et al. (2002) appears quite convincing, particularly given their innovative and uniquely diligent approach to measuring the extent of entry regulations across countries. However, the veracity of their results and conclusions begins to fade with simple reference to a plot of their regulation data and data on cultural values collected by Hofstede (1991) -the demonstrated correlation between the two country-level measures is above 0.6 (n = 48, p < 0.0001, see Figure 1 for the scatter plot).
In the pages to follow we examine several aspects of findings of Djankov et al. and report contrary results based on the addition of culture variables into the analyses and a more rigorous analysis approach using structural equations modeling.
Theoretical background and hypotheses

Different regulatory patterns
Regulation patterns are different from nation to nation (Nicoletti, 2001) . Different national traditions conceive of the allocation of social authority in different ways, and likewise allow access to regulatory space to different organizations and agencies (Hancher and Moran, 1989) . Certainly the data presented by Djankov et al. (2002) best demonstrate such differences.
Some studies in regulation style have shown distinctive cultural and institutional characteristics in individual countries. For instance, France is known for its paternalistic conception of prerogative power toward regulation (Hayward, 1983) , compared with the Dutch corporatist tradition toward coping with passionate social interests (Arentsen and Kunneke, 2001; Waarden, 1992) . The belief in liberalism gives the U.S. 
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